Great Game On: A Review

Australia's former ambassador to China (2007-2011), APEC (2003-2005), and the World Trade Organisation (1998-2001), Geoff Raby, provides an entertaining and scholarly combination of personal stories, historical fact, and informed opinion on the dynamics of international relations in his book "Great Game On: The Contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy". The title references the old "Great Game" between Russia and the UK over Central Asia in the 19th century, including the Russian invasion of some republics, the British invasion of Tibet, and the decline of the Qing dynasty in China. The basic question being addressed is whether China or Russia will become dominant in the Central Asian republics, sometimes referred to as "the 'stans", a reference to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan (all former Soviet Republics), plus Afghanistan and the Chinese province of Xinjiang.

The subtitle of the books seems challenging: the idea that the contest between China and Russia over these republics could be a major part of a global contest for supremacy. But the opening chapters argue the case that the outcome in the 'stans will be a significant contribution to the outcome in the wider Eurasian context and all that follows, and for context, Rabey makes a significant point of outlining the fall of the US-supported regime in Afghanistan with similarities with their loss in the Vietnam War. As has been quipped (attributed to Norman Finklestein): "If you ever feel useless, remember it took 20 years, trillions of dollars and 4 US Presidents to replace the Taliban with the Taliban". Still, it even with Afghanistan in consideration, it is difficult to see how relative dominance in the central Asian republics will necessarily translate to Eurasian, let alone global, supremacy. Raby's argument hinges on opportunity costs: "Having achieved security in Eurasia, China can turn to project its prodigious power globally".

Raby makes a significant effort to illustrate that Russia and China, commonly seen as in some sort of alliance by Western powers, are in competition. It should be obvious that, at the very least, they are in an alliance of convenience against the United States, in particular with joint declarations, but a deeper historical analysis illustrates deep suspicions on both sides. Russia has not forgotten that the Central Asian republics were once part of the Soviet Union, and they had considerable sway over Xinjiang. Even when both countries shared a nominal communist ideology, Raby points out that Mao was often given directives by Stalin and never treated as an equal, Mao's public adoption of Stalinism in the Sino-Soviet split notwithstanding. In those days, China was trying to find its own relative independence against a powerful Russia. Now it is Russia's turn to be a secondary power to China's ascendancy and influence, and whilst China retains good trading relations with Russia, their blunt statements about the principle of territorial sovereignty during the Ukraine war must be noticed in Moscow.

This is a significant difference between the Chinese and Russian approaches to influence. Despite the relative prevalence of non-Russians in leadership in the Soviet Union, in most regards, the Soviet Union had many of the characteristics of Russian imperialism. As Raby notes, "Russia's conquest of Central Asia had less to do with geopolitical competition, as is often claimed by Great Game historians, and much more to do with acquiring status and respect for Imperial Russia through colonisation". With the collapse of the Soviet Union (as opposed to popular democratic uprising, such as in the Baltics), these states initially went through a transitional period, marked with some conflict, to gradual independence and with that independence an increased connection with China, which trade figures illustrate quite bluntly. Following other commentators, Raby agrees with the description that the region is converting from "Sovietstan" to "Sinostan". But China's influence over the central Asian republics, like its influence elsewhere and with the exception of historically-grounded claims, is based on trading relationships and trade networks, rather than shared language, religion, or ideology. It is not without reason that China's "Belt and Road" follows a very similar path to the historical "Silk Road".

It is on this matter that Raby raises the most challenging question of his book; will the "alliance of convenience" between Russia and China fracture over effective influence over the central Asian republics, and does the Western alliance have any opportunities as a result? In this regard, Raby is very much influenced by "offensive realist" international relations, that is, where an opportunity exists a state will assert its power to fill in any gap, real or perceived. Miscalculations in the latter have dire consequences, as the United States in recent times and others over hundreds of years have found out. Raby considered the relative caution of China to be part of its recent history; after a hundred years of effective foreign European control, it faced decades of civil war, warlords, and Japanese invasion, until the communists emerged victorious. Under Mao, China regained its feet, under Deng it began to grow, and now Xi is at the helm when it is a genuine power. But Raby points out that that has occured after many years of relative weakness, and there are still the nagging issues of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and the South China Sea on the doorstep. China is all too aware of how its current position of power still has disastrous fracture lines, and besides, whilst it is winning the economic game, it is unlikely to engage in military assertion.

One may add that neither Russia nor China are run by irrational leaders either. Russia and China will remain in an alliance of convenience while both of them perceive a threat, from their perspective, of US militarism. That is very unlikely to go away anytime soon, even if there are several indicators (weakening of the economy and trade, belligerent militarism) that indicate that the US is in decline in respect, power, and ultimately influence. Whilst there is the US as a power that can project globally and whose projecting is opposed by China and Russia, who are sufficiently powerful in their own right, the reasons for convenience remain. Raby notes that India, despite its own size and growth, is not a significant player outside its own borders and certainly lacks notable influence over Central Asia. Writing as an Australian, he notes that this middle-power status has been historically reliant on the UK and the US, but in terms of economic ties, China is Australia's main trading partner. Whilst there is a great deal of anti-Chinese sentiment, even to the extent of the Federal government, Australia is both tied to an anti-Chinese AUKUS alliance, but also to a more neutral ASEAN position.

One thing that must be mentioned in this context is that, despite a lot of similarities relative to the rest of the world, the differences between the Central Asian republics almost ensure that any sort of greater unity among them is challenging. What appears to outsiders as minor differences in ethnicity or religion are considered very large differences between those who hold to these identities, and, as a result, they are less able to present a united front toward either China or Russia. The only power of the region that even comes close to a "middle power" status is Kazakhstan, and even then, they have a long way to go.

Ultimately, Raby thinks that the best option, from the perspective of liberal democracies, is two-fold. The first is to "credibly" respect China's international borders and disengage from encouraging separatism, especially in regions like Xinjiang and Tibet. If this placates China's concerns, the second trajectory is to "re-Europeanise" Russia in a post-Putin environment, especially given the damage done to the Russian economy as part of the Ukraine war. Raby sees a failure to do this as all but guaranteeing that Russia falls entirely under China's influence in the longer term. However, this predication assumes that the Russian economy has suffered critically from the war and that a post-Putin environment will occur relatively soon. Whilst the latter is unknown, what evidence is available suggests that the Russian economy is, despite the material losses from the war, actually in a state of some growth. The matter of whether the United States will be able to retain its position of global influence is perhaps one that needs closer attention, and that is an answer not found in this book. Essentially, one can say that China has already won the contest for influence in Central Asia and perhaps Russia as well.