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The Future of the Malay States

Tearing down of the Dutch flag Surabaya

Like so many parts of the world the Malay states (defined here as Nusantara; Indonesia, Malaysia, Timor-Leste, Brunei and perhaps Singapore), are victims of European colonialism. The borders that exist are not borders of their own chosing. The largest country, Indonesia, is the outcome of the gradual expansion from the Dutch East Indies Company and the subsequently nationalised colonies. Timor-Leste's borders are the remains of the Portuguese presence. Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei are the result of British interests in the region and in particular the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 which divided the archipelago. As a result, there is very uneven political and economic development in the region and difficulties with national identity and conflicts between and within countries.

This should not however, prohibit raising potential developments with a perspective of modernisation, common wealth, human rights and federalism regardless of the difficulties. As Oscar Wilde correctly observed; "A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias."

Human Rights and Democracy

More important than national or religious self-determination is the principles of universal rights. Universal rights transcend the contextually-bound rights. It is universal rights which allow for national and religious self-determination, but the latter must never be allowed to limit the former. Thus section 160 of the constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, which defines a Malay citizen on the basis of (Islamic) religious identity, and the special discriminatory bumiputra rights according under section 153, are antithetical to a the equal treatment of citizens, and especially the sizable Indian and Chinese communities. In contrast there is preference for the old call for a "Malaysian Malaysia", by the Malaysia Solidarity Council or in a more contemporary (albeit vague) sense "Bangsa Malaysia" by former Prime Minister Mahatir (the police actions against and the eventual banning of the Hindu Rights Action Force and the detention of leaders under the Internal Security Act is evidence of how weak this policy is). The general principle is, in contrast to the use of explicitly racist theories from the likes of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, a citizen should be defined on the basis of birthright within the country or naturalisation with language competence, not characteristics like religion or the mythical category of 'race'.

If political progress in Malaysia requires the painful removal of ethnic supremacy for the majority, then Indonesia's task perhaps will be greater. For although it is still little known, the question concerning West Papua still looms large. The acquisition of these lands in the widely condemned "Act of Free Choice" during Sukarno's reign was simply the transition of Dutch imperialism to Indonesian imperialism (with backing of the United States of America and capitulation by Australia) with the aspirations of the indigenous Melanesian people ignored and - like East Timor - often brutalised. The resource rich region is a highly significant source of income for Indonesia and the mining companies such as Freeport-McMoRan and Rio Tinto. Little of this has been returned to the local people; they have received the effects of environmental damage instead. Like East Timor, the people of West Papua must be given the opportunity for themselves to determine whether they wish to be ruled by Jakarta and, in the interest of universal rights, Indonesians must be prepared to acknowledge that they will probably want to leave.

None of this is meant to excuse the smaller Malay states of their breaches of human rights. The Melayu Islam Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy) of Brunei is hardly known for being tolerant of criticism with a highly subservient media. The entire Legislative Council, whose powers are consultative only, is appointed by the Sultan after the one free election (in 1962) resulted in every electable seat being won by the subsequently banned Brunei People's Party. Press freedom in Singapore has likewise been ranked consistently low and the existence of poorly developed separation of powers has meant that most political analysts can describe the country as a partial democracy at best. The plurality voting system of the Group Representation Constituency is a particularly cynical method of the PAP to retain power. Finally, whilst Timor-Leste has a healthy and competitive system of electoral politics, although the political crisis and riots of 2006 and the coup attempt in 2008 continue to cast a shadow over the possibility of a stable and democratic system.

Federalism and Commonwealth

As a political procedure and institution, the superiority of federalist methods are once again evident by the experience of the Malay states. The key distinction between a federal political system and a unitary system being the existence of localised independent states and the right and ability of these entities to join or leave a larger political entity of their own will (the civil war in the United States being a particular case in contrary). In this context, the short-lived United States of Indonesia cannot seriously be considered a federal system with any degree or intent of permanance; the Republic of Indonesia (consisting of most of Sumatra and Java) had a combined population of 31 million whereas the fifteen federal states established by the Dutch, with typical insensitivity to cultural borders, had populations between 100,000 and 11 million. Under such artificial borders of colonial construction it was impossible for the federal states to survive. Since the establishment of the unitary state various Indonesian governments have engaged in a number of serious military and police actions against local populations seeking separatism or autonomy, including Timor-Leste, West Papua, Aceh, the southern Moulaccas and so forth.

In contrast Malaysia has not engaged in such actions as it has not needed to. With a federal system, even potentially destructive effects such as the decision of Brunei not to join the federation and the expulsion of Singapore in 1965, were resolved peacefully, although with some disappointment, and far more so than the Konfrontasi launched by Indonesia against Malaysia in Sarawak and Sabah. The main challenge to federalism in Malaysia is the attempts to introduce sharia law instead of civil law in some jurisdictions along with other restrictions on religious faith. As mentioned previously, such breaches of universal rights must be not be permitted, for the imposition of one religious law is an attack on religious freedom for others. A weakness in Malaysian federalism is the lack of real financial autonomy for the federal states.

It is notable that Indonesia has in recent years moved increasingly towards regional autonomy (although not quite federalism) and at the same time with greater levels of democracy, reduction of the role of the military in politics, and improved civil rights. Perhaps most federalist in orientation however is the Indonesian approach to income taxation law, which varies according to regional government reflecting the varying purchasing power of the currency. It is also worth noting in this context the use of land tax as a source of income in Indonesia and especially Singapore (which has corresponding very low income tax levels and extremely low levels of corruption). By comparing the different welfare systems of the Malay states, attempts at establishing a commonwealth for the population can be seen in the provision of universal health care and pension funds in Malaysia, and a recent expansion in education expenditures in Indonesia. Timor-Leste has also made a recent decisions to derive all public funds from natural resources (specifically off-shore oil and gas) and to engage expenditure in enabling infrastructure, health and education.

Uneven Development

From this very brief and incomplete overview the uneven development within and between the Malay states should be evident. For isocratic principles, being the liberty of the individual, fair access to the commonwealth, and a localisation of political rule it is possible to describe each of the states in terms of their progressive development and in terms of priorities and possible political trajectories. Thus, it not unfair to say that Timor Leste has the best record of providing religious freedom (despite interference in secular law by the Roman Catholic Church), closely followed by Singapore (discrimination against the Jehovah's Witnesses refusual to engage in military service being a sticking point), then Indonesia (despite attempting to shoehorn animist faiths into Hinduism), then much further behind Brunei, and in last place Malaysia, which provides a number of serious obstacles to Muslim apostasy, including jail, whippings and fines for this "crime". As religious freedom is the foundation of political liberty this must have political priority; the gravest danger to the Malay states is the lack of separation between church and state.

When local autonomy and democracy does not exist, regional separatism is inevitable, especially in a part of the world where the national language, Malay, is spoken by as the first language by a minority. Indonesia has particularly suffered over the decades with its ideology of a unitary state and recent moves towards regional autonomy have lessened separatist desires with the enduring exception of West Papua, which must ultimately be provided the opportunity for national self-determination. Despite having a relatively balanced states on population roughly based on cultural affinities (perhaps Perlis could be absorbed into Kedah, perhaps Selangor could be split into the southern and western Shah Alam and north and eastern Petaling Jaya), Malaysia's federalism is threatened by a lack of secularism, systematic and institutional racism, and a lack of financial autonomy for the regions - all areas which Indonesia has made recent substantial improvements. A significant problem throughout the region is a poor implementation of the doctrine of the separation of powers within government. The long and disasterous involvement of the military in Indonesian politics being a particular case in point, but it is also a significant feature in collusion between the Singaporean judiciary and legislative systems. Of course, in absolute monarchies like Brunei there is no separation of powers worth speaking of.

In economic and welfare development, Singapore has lead the way with a strong emphasis on ensuring a high capital to labour ratio (thus ensuring high wages) and a taxation system which discourages resource speculation and encourages productivity, whereas Brunei effective utilisation of natural resources to provide a exceedingly good welfare system (free education, medical services, subsidised food and housing) relative to the region is likewise to be applauded. Malaysia's economy succeeds when it engages in capitalisation, and fails when it engages in corrupt GLCs (Government Linked Companies) and allows race politics to dominate. The Indonesian and Timor-Leste economies remain far behind in terms of industrialisation, infrastructure, and distribution of wealth.

An Isocratic Vision

The possibility of a secular, liberal, democratic and commonwealth federation of Malay states is a difficult path, given the current distribution of power and weight of history that weighs upon these coutries. Nevertheless the possibility of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (translated from old Javanese as "Unity in Diversity", literally "In pieces, yet One") can become a working reality under the following criteria.

  • Separation of church and state; no state religion, no compulsory religious identification, no religious laws enforced.
  • Republican government; monarchs, sultans etc to have no direct political power, titles to be retained for historical and cultural reasons only.
  • Genuine Democracy; press freedom, separation of powers, end various Internal Security Acts.
  • National self-determination and federalism; independence referendums for aggrieved regions, local governments based on cultural groups independent of the capital (probably Singapore!)
  • National unity based on common language (Malay), common currency and wealth generated from natural resources directed towards universal welfare services.

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Indonesia and Separatism: Finding a Federalist Solution
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM670.cfm