The Non-Aggression Principle: Failures of Subjective Deontology

It should go without saying that most people are intuitively opposed to violence. In most cases, people would like nothing less than to go about their daily business without interruption. It is from this principle that various "libertarian capitalists" developed an ethical system called "the non-aggression principle", whereby all "aggression" is defined as a unethical. "Aggression" is defined in this context as the initiation of force against persons or property, and allows for protective self-defense under these circumstances. It is explicitly deontological in its orientation, that is, arguing that all aggression, so-defined, is wrong [1]. As an attempt to shore-up the position, similar historical references from classical liberalism are often invoked [2].

There are plentiful arguments against the NAP which will be outlined here. Firstly, is issue of subjective property and personal space assertions. Secondly, there is the issues that arise from a lack of proportionality in the "self-defense" clause. Thirdly, there is consequentialist issues which make the de-ontological approach ethically absurd. In addition to these there are ethical situations which make NAP impossible. In addition to these, there is similar pacifistic approaches which also subject to similar criticisms and by which comparison is worthwhile. In recognising these issues, an initial sketch of an alternative is posited which incorporates consequentialist and utilitan ethics.

The first problem with the NAP is that it based on subjective claims of rights to property and personal space, but claims an objective response ("self-defense") when these rights are transgressed. A capitalist claims different property rights to a socialist, a landlord claims different property rights to a communalist, and so forth. Which of these is right? In a sense it doesn't matter, because unless a property claim is universally accepted, then the violation of property rights becomes moot. For the socialist, the capitalist engages in violence every time they make a profit, for the communualist, every time the landlord extracts rent, etc, and more to the point that they consider these these expropriations were prior initiations of violence. Claims that the individuals concerned accepted the wage or rent "by choice" are not really valid either, as voluntaristic claims in what they percieve as a "Hobson's Choice" environment are not justifications to the person's affected. Would the capitalist or landlord accept a "self-defense" argument when they try to claim their surplus value or rent? Probably not - but that their subjective assertion of property rights as well.

As one Reditter, dietsodaworks, pointed out subjective assertions to property rights end up being a circular argument [3].

• You claim you don't use aggression.
• You define aggression as the initiation of force.
• You then define the initiation of force as using force to implement and maintain all property systems except your own.
• Therefore, you conclude you don't use aggression.

That is a circular argument.

Whilst this relates to matters of political economy, some people on the "propertarian" side of politics have noticed that subjectivism is a problem in the matter of individual assessments of rights, such as abortion. Some propertians will claim that a fetus is not a person and the decision for abortion comes down to the individual mother, and preventing her from acquiring such a medical procedure is a violation of the NAP. Others will claim that that a fetus has intrinsic rights independent of the mother and that an abortion is a violation of the fetus' rights. We may note of course that such advocates have never suggested that it can have them outside of her body then and nor have they offered to take care of the little darlings.

Subjectivism also plagues the matter of proportionality. After all, if there is no objective standard on which harm is claimed in the first place, it follows that the degree of harm and the response is likewise a matter of subjectivity. As if often joked, in typical bad taste by NAP advocates, "if you scratch my arm you'll get a McNuke (TM) in response". This may be a joke response, but it underlies a real issue with the lack of an in-built sense of proportional response where the old-style signage "Trespassers will be shot" becomes a morally justifiable claim. It is a ludicrious notion of "aggression" which doesn't accept that this exists as a matter of degrees, nor does it take into account future estimations of violence. If one has a gun pointed at them, that is possibly an act of aggression. But does the NAP advocate have to wait until the trigger is pulled before it is definitely aggression?

Almost needless to say, it also explicitly prohibits of course utilitarian calculations; a minor redistribution of income from the exceptionally wealthy who would barely notice the loss to a life-saving expenditure to a great number of people whose mortality is certain without such expenditure is explicitly forbidden.

To elaborate from this perhaps the most significant criticism of the NAP however is when one is in a position (c.f., trolley problem graphic) [4] where all choices cause some harm, or to use NAP terms "initiate violence". When confronted with logical contradictions like this, some NAP advocates argue that to remain consistent with the principles of non-aggression, that no choice should be made - thus ensuring the deaths of multiple individuals rather than taking action that will cause the death of one. Of course, in a sense this avoidance of any responsibility is the "correct" choice from this deontological position, where an ethical grounding in reality is explicitly avoided in favour of abstract rules. This apparently is not a pathology to "principled" NAP advocates.

It should evident at this point that the NAP as a deontological standard is simply not viable as it results in absurd results. Nevertheless, as a general perspective most people do oppose the initiation of violence and accept the concept of self-defense, and in that regard it is rather like principled pacifism (albeit of the "self-defense only" variety). Even Mahatma Gandhi, whom it must be said avoided violence as best he possibly could under the principle of ahimsa, acknowledged there were times when it was unavoidable: ""Perfect, erring mortals as we are, there is no course open to us but the destruction of rabid dogs. At times we may be faced with the unavoidable duty of killing even a man who is found in the act of killing people." [5]

This is not to suggest that principled morals ought to be easily abandoned when in the context of situational ethics. Frances Kamm for example [6] is one contemporary ethicist which who argues that deontological moral principles provide the foundation and the goal of ethical behaviour which then are then navigated according to situations towards that end with proportionate action, and in doing so incorporates utilitarian and, perhaps accidentially, consequentialist approaches as well (at least in terms of motive or rule consquentialism). In a further sense, pragmatic morals [7] can also contribute, insofar that it recognises constant improvement in moral theory (something that is often a difficult concept to dogmatic deontologists), incorporates aggregate social utility, and recognises that societal limitations and context to moral action.

Instead of principles that are divorced from reality it is better to adopt ethics which are deeply embodied in the reality of contextual circumstances which are also orientated towards the best possible ends with the most principled motivations, with the best use of available information, and with carefully considered proportional action. Deontological approaches with expressed as in absolute are simply impossible and can often lead to worse moral outcomes. Likewise subjectivity of effects and actions must be explicitly rejected except in those cases which are pragmatically subjective. In this way, an increase in liberty - in both the positive and negative sense - can be constantly improved for all, and with the greatest improvements for those who currently suffer the greatest lack.

Notes

[1] cf., Roderick Long, . "Nonaggression axiom" in Ronald Hamowy, "The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism", 2008, pp357-360

[2] For example: Walter Block, The Non-Aggression Axiom of Libertarianism, lewrockwell.com. February 17, 2003
http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block26.html

[3] dietsodaworks, The NAP Debunked, Reddit, 24 May 2015
https://www.reddit.com/r/Anarcho_Capitalism/comments/374cha/the_nap_debu...

[4] Lev Lafayette, Under the NAP I Am Not Allowed To Decide, Facebook, September 2, 2017
https://www.facebook.com/groups/1620190871547616/permalink/2032801876953178

[5] Mahatma Gandhi, "Is This Humanity?" in 'Young India', 21st Oct 1926. See also the discussion in "The Life Of Mahatma Gandhi" (1951)

[6] Frances Kamm, "Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm", Oxford University Press, 2006

[7] Hugh LaFollette, "Pragmatic ethics" in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, 2000